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approaches that can survive not 
only different administrations and 
electoral cycles but interagency dif-
ferences and bureaucratic turf wars�
One of this reviewer’s only regrets is 
that—barring a few segments in the 
introduction and conclusion—the 
author chooses not to apply his findings 
to the study of more-contemporary 
COIN campaigns� Dr� Ladwig has 
acquired a reputation in the field of 
South Asia studies for his careful, 
methodical approach to the region’s 
security challenges, and it would have 
been useful for the reader to get a better 
sense of his take on the past, present, 
and future of U�S� policy on Afghanistan� 
It also might have been interesting to 
explore the challenges that come with 
more-multidirectional proxy wars, 
such as that currently unfolding in 
Syria, which involves multiple potential 
clients and competing “candidate 
patron” states, ranging from Turkey to 
Russia and Iran� These are all minor 
quibbles, however, and ones that Ladwig 
no doubt can address in a follow-on 
study, should he wish to do so�
All in all, this is an excellent and 
well-timed contribution� Moreover, 
despite being an academic work, it 
also is an example of the virtues of the 
more interdisciplinary, even subtle, 
approach to security studies embraced 
by European institutions such as King’s 
College� Drawing not only on well-
researched history but on other social 
sciences such as economic theory, The 
Forgotten Front is refreshingly jargon-
free and clearly written, thus making it 
an ideal study companion for readers 
of the Naval War College Review�
ISKANDER REHMAN
Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every 
War It Starts, by Harlan Ullman� Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2017� 272 pages� $29�95�
When former Secretaries of State 
General Colin Powell and John Kerry 
and former Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe Marine general Jim Jones (for 
whom I worked when I commanded 
the International Security Assistance 
Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan when it 
expanded across the whole country) 
call Harlan Ullman’s Anatomy of Failure 
a must-read, people should pay atten-
tion� And for those who worry about 
policy books being boring, House of 
Cards creator Michael, Lord Dobbs 
deems Anatomy, in another blurb, a 
combination of the works of best-selling 
thriller novelist Tom Clancy and Carl 
von Clausewitz� All are correct�
In the interests of full disclosure, the 
writer and I have been friends and 
colleagues since my time at ISAF� As 
Britain’s Chief of the General Staff and 
then Chief of the Defence Staff, I worked 
with Ullman on many issues� Irrespec-
tive of this, Anatomy is essential reading 
for practitioners and students of foreign, 
defense, and national security policy�
The book’s center of gravity is the asking 
and answering of the vital question 
of why, since World War II, America 
arguably has lost all the wars it started 
and has failed in military interventions 
in which it did not have just cause 
to participate� This question alone 
directly challenges the accepted view 
in Washington that America has the 
best and most formidable military in 
the world� If that is the case, despite 
some stunning tactical successes, why, 
at the strategic level, has its record in 
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using that military been so apparently 
dismal over the past seventy years?
Of course, Ullman records, we won the 
big wars: World War II and the Cold 
War� And, as he notes, George H� W� 
Bush was entirely successful in winning 
the First Gulf War in 1991� But in Korea 
and especially Vietnam, Iraq the second 
time, Afghanistan, and numerous lesser 
operations—ranging from Grenada 
and Beirut in 1983 to Libya in 2011 
and the ongoing campaign in Syria—he 
argues persuasively that the results 
range from simply bad to catastrophic�
In the first two-thirds of the book, 
Ullman examines—in depth and with 
personal insights, in what he calls 
vignettes—why America’s resort to 
using military force has been so poor� 
He produces three overarching reasons 
that apply not only to the United States 
but to many other countries—including, 
most certainly, my own� First, America 
elected too many presidents who were 
inexperienced, unprepared, and 
unready to handle what may be the 
most difficult job on earth� Through 
the lens of the use of military force, 
the book analyzes the strengths and 
weaknesses of every president since 
World War II, noting along the way 
John F� Kennedy’s rueful observation 
that “there is no school for presidents�”
Second, administrations that failed 
applied poor, or simply wrong, strategic 
judgment in determining whether to 
go to war or to use force� The Kennedy-
Johnson decision makers truly believed 
that monolithic Communism had to 
be stopped on the Mekong River so it 
would not spread to the Mississippi� Bill 
Clinton believed a few bombs would 
force Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic to stop 
killing Kosovars� George W� Bush had 
the flawed vision that the geostrategic 
landscape of the Middle East could be 
changed forever by democratizing Iraq, 
although he justified the decision to 
go to war on nonexistent weapons of 
mass destruction� Barack Obama drew 
“redlines” and demanded that Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad stand down—
to no effect—and he “led from behind” 
in bombing Libya, bringing about 
Mu‘ammar Gadhafi’s downfall—thereby 
provoking a brutal civil war� Who 
knows what Donald Trump could do?
Third, the book shows how the lack of 
sufficient knowledge or understanding 
of the regions and conditions where 
force might be used guaranteed failure, 
from Vietnam to the current misnamed 
“war on terror�” What gives this book an 
added and authoritative dimension is the 
author’s personal insights that comple-
ment the book’s theme� As a Swift boat 
skipper in Vietnam, his stories of that 
war underscore the folly of America’s 
intervention� At times during the Cold 
War, whether in discussions with former 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara or 
the Pentagon leadership under Ronald 
Reagan, or in later years with those 
dealing with terrorism, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan, he reveals the damage that 
lack of knowledge and understanding 
will inflict on any policy and strategy�
The vignette that struck me in particular 
was a sensitive mission that Ullman un-
dertook in Vietnam as part of Operation 
PHOENIX, an assassination program that 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
South Vietnamese mounted to terminate 
with prejudice (i�e�, kill) suspected 
Vietcong and North Vietnamese agents� It 
was a metaphor for why the war was lost�
In the remaining third of the book, 
Ullman itemizes a series of recom-
mendations to overcome or reduce the 
likelihood of failures in using military 
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force that arise from electing unready 
presidents and using poor or flawed 
strategic judgment, and to ensure that 
sufficient knowledge and understanding 
of the reasons for using or rejecting 
military force are in place� He calls for 
a “brains based approach” to strategic 
thinking—a term that I, as army and 
defense chief, borrowed shamelessly� 
He proposes a “Bletchley Park–like 
capacity” for using open-source material 
available on social media and unclas-
sified avenues such as Google Earth to 
enhance knowledge and understanding�
Some of Ullman’s recommendations are 
unique to the United States, but in the 
main any and all leaders and students 
of national security will benefit greatly 
from this book� Indeed, to reinforce 
the recommendation of Messrs� Powell, 
Kerry, and Jones, read this book! And, 
as Lord Dobbs adds, this is a very 
good and intriguing read as well�
LORD RICHARDS OF HERSTMONCEUX
Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Im-
perial Germany, 1871–1914, by Xu Qiyu, trans� 
Joshua Hill� Foreword by Graham Allison� Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017� 368 pages� $32�
Once in a great while, a book allows the 
familiar to be viewed through new eyes� 
Fragile Rise is such a volume� On its 
surface, it is an account of imperial Ger-
many’s catastrophic grand strategy be-
tween the nation’s founding in 1871 and 
the onset of the First World War� While 
this is well-tilled ground, Fragile Rise 
provides a clear and convincing account 
of how Otto von Bismarck mitigated the 
tensions created by Germany’s newfound 
power within the European system, and 
how his successors failed at the same 
task� But what makes Fragile Rise unique 
is less what it says than who is saying 
it� The author, Xu Qiyu, is an active-
duty colonel in the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) who serves 
as deputy director of the Institute for 
Strategic Studies at the National Defense 
University in Beijing—the counterpart 
to the U�S� National Defense University�
USN readers who harbor cartoonish 
images of our PLA counterparts may 
be surprised at the depth of research 
and insight offered in this volume� Xu 
has been a visiting fellow and guest of a 
number of prestigious Western institu-
tions, including the Naval War College, 
where he is respected as a subtle and 
engaging thinker� His research and writ-
ing reflect that experience, informed by 
international scholarship and primary-
source material from across Europe�
Throughout the book, Xu draws no 
explicit parallels between the German 
and Chinese experiences, although the 
book’s translator points out that the 
cover of the Chinese edition features the 
words “When it is difficult to see clearly 
into the future, looking back into his-
tory, even the history of other peoples, 
might be the right choice�” In China 
there is a long tradition of using histori-
cal examples to offer implicit criticism 
of what may not be criticized officially, 
and how Fragile Rise can be viewed in 
this light is apparent upon reading�
Xu characterizes the newly unified 
Germany as following a “hide and bide” 
strategy, recalling Deng Xiaoping’s 
guidance that an emerging China 
should hide its capabilities and bide its 
time, avoiding international leadership 
and the complications that come from 
displays of power� By 1878, however, 
Germany found itself a factor and a 
source of concern in the international 
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